61 Mech | 61 Mech
Spontaneous human combustion (SHC) is a pseudo-scientific hypothesis any prior notice meaning it catches light without any fire trigger i:e naked flame The theory that has gained the most favor to date is the wick theory. caused by a localized heat-increasing reaction between the oxidant and the. Combustion reaction synonyms, Combustion reaction pronunciation, Combustion reaction translation, English dictionary definition of Combustion reaction. n. 1. At the time of Operation Yahoo in April-May , 61 Mech was about 1 . All together 72 of their fighters were thus taken out of the fighting equation. .. up — the enemy picture neatly marked and kept up to date hour-by-hour. We needed to shift the killing ground to the north of the Bravo was my cry for meaning .
Burns to the body are deeply inconsistent. While the body and skeleton are reduced to ashes, the lower legs often remain, appearing as the victim might have casually placed them last, clothed and shod. In other cases a torso might be left, and in many cases the skull remains along with the lower legs. Some believe spontaneous human combustion is a natural occurrence that is not yet understood.
The scientific community rejects this notion out of hand, pointing to the body's water content and no known physical trigger for combustion. Many theories have been put forth in an effort to explain alleged spontaneous human combustion in other terms. The theory that has gained the most favor to date is the wick theory. The wick theory charges that if clothing were to begin a slow burn, noxious fumes could render a person unconscious.
From here, the low-flaming fire could spread over the body, melting body fat, which would soak the clothes, turning them into a virtual wick. While the "wick" slowly burned, the body fat would keep the fire alive. Eventually, when the entire body was consumed, the fire would go out. Proponents of this theory point out that this could account for the fire's containment.
They also claim it explains why the lower legs are often left, as they have little fat content. The main body of the gasifier was made up d. Place the desired amount of the mixture in the of stainless steel and was divided into two sections.
These sections were the top cylinder reaction e. Lit the wood shavings with the gas range lighter. After 20 seconds, turn ON the fan. After1 minute carefully close the gasifier. The middle part or reaction chamber was the heart h. Monitor the temperature inside the reactor of the gasifier where the syngas is produced .
Take note that the temperature should be flows down by gravity. Flanged at the top and white smoke can be observed which is an bottom of both cylinders were welded to minimize the indication of syngas.
To further check the syngas, leak. The chamber was also consisted of mechanical lit the thick white smoke with the gas range lighter. A flame in the flare tower signifies the presence of The bottom cylinder or ash chamber contained the the syngas.
Measure the temperature of the syngas using the process of the biomass was stored and occasionally Extech wide range Mini IR Thermometer. Monitor the temperature; take note of the The maximum capacity of the developed gasifier maximum temperature that the gasifier can reach.
Height of the column was 45cm and has a 35 When a decrease in temperature was observed, cm inside diameter column. The stainless steel flaring tower m. Discharge the char, collect and weigh.
Union was used as a and assembly of the wood-fired gasifier prototype is connector for easy removal of clogs, particularly soot, included here. The performance of the gasifier based tar and condensate.
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Supplying the air needed for on percent conversion of biomass to syngas by gasification, Lotus centrifugal blower having - obtaining the amount of the residue is also presented. A 28cm grate, manifold, char nipple outlet, char pan, roller, diameter stainless steel perforated plate was used as gas pipe, blower, filter, syngas controller, syngas grate. For monitoring of temperature, thermocouple Table 1.
Material Specifications of the Main Gasifier was used. Solid rod, 20in long, was utilized to stir the Parts Dimension Materials of feed inside the reactor chamber. Material Specification of the Auxiliary 1. Cost of Materials and Miscellaneous The air flow rate, blower percentage opening and Items the closing time in minutes are the operating Item Qty Unit Price Cost conditions that also needs establishment.
On the left Lighters 5 pcs. Sensor Type, 1 pc. This relationship was shown Syngas Analysis 2 Tests 3, Between 1 kg, 1. With this condition, heat To assist in the start-up of the combustion loss was minimized and the highest temperature was process, proper timing on turning on the blower was attained.
Time of Turning on the Blower Gasifier Performance Time sec Observations The percent conversion of the gasifier was 10 Flame did not continue calculated based on the amount of feed and the 15 Flame continue slightly but went off easily amount of the char collected after gasification.
The 20 Flame continued formula used was: From the observations, it can be concluded that the 20 seconds time span after start-up was the best condition in turning on the blower. Air flow rate, Blower condition and closing time of Air flow rate: Many Black and White people in Namibia greeted us with friendliness in Afrikaans.
His name was Alex Britz and he came to greet us in Tsumeb, my friend from many years ago. We shared a few Windhoek beers, shed some tears and laughed. It was about the good old days. We were seated comfortably on old army camp chairs reminiscing about times of Yore. A camp fire was smouldering gently away on dry Camel Thorn. We banded around its companionship as old warriors sometimes do. We were all lost in thought about the past and what had happened during Operation Yahoo in April-Maythirty years ago.
Memories came rushing back as I wrote this chronicle………. Yahoo had been a military operation I will never forget! It was one of the most challenging and exciting fractions of my life and military career. The military and civilian people who lived and died during that period touched my soul. I must be careful of what I utter, as emotions flood back in ebb and flow. People had learned through this life-long struggle I thought, politicians as well…Hopefully…?
Through the many years of bitterness and fighting a better form of peace had been created in our part of the world byhad it not? Yahoo had done its bit for sure, from all the sides involved. What follows is the story of Operation Yahoo as I saw it. It is not an easy story to tell. It is not simple either. State of Play — us and Them Elusive Serenity South Of the Red Line To the south of Omuthiya and the Red Line one could find a few farms and the town of Tsumeb, wrapped in languid African serenity… Beyond Tsumeb, the farms and the bush and the mountains nestled the settlements of Otavi and Grootfontein and some more farms.
It belonged to the communities within which 61 Mech flourished — some of our own permanent force families as well. We lived amongst these people of northern SWA. Our children went to school there, whilst their soldier fathers went to the north, mostly far away from home…Even Omuthiya, the operational base of 61 Mech, which was km north of Tsumeb.
The community saw 61 Mech as belonging to them — their bulwark against terrorism. Strangely enough the aforementioned towns prospered during the South African Border war. These small settlements became affluent, notwithstanding the war, but because of the war. It was quite pleasant for us from 61 Mech, to live and fight there, in the African warmth and the companionships of the people we befriended there.
It was this elusive serenity 61 Mech found up north — the tranquillity wherein ordinary people lived and could die violently. The odd tourist, who came to visit the Etosha Game Reserve, could not discern off-hand that these communities were gripped by fear. This you could only read on their faces came April-May each year. When the insurgents came with the rain and the Winter Games began…Once again… Back to Basics — Operational Relevancies of Our Time To appreciate Operation Yahoo better it is important to identify with the position of 61 Mech before the fighting came about.
These included the operational relevancies which led up to the action of April-May One significant reason for the latter was that 61 Mech played an essential role during Operation Yahoo.
It is important to note that 61 Mech had participated in a fair number of internal as well as external operations during The external fighting zone was denoted by the Angolan 5th Military Region.
Twenty two terrorists had infiltrated the Death Triangle on 6 April It had been an extremely successful operation, fared by a joint task force of Sector 30 under the command of 61Mech. The operation was completed within thirteen days. Eighteen insurgents were killed and three captured. Chance put me in position to shoot the last insurgent from my Ratel on 18 April Only one combatant escaped. Major General Charles Lloyd was happy with the results of the operation. The counter-insurgency task force, together with the community, felt pleased about their combined achievement.
Normal life in this particular sector of the northern operational area of SWA resumed peacefully until 14 April Thrown into boot were a few bothersome Cuban forces and Russian military advisors. FAPLA had now been driven back: Search and destroy operations were effectively directed from a tactical headquarters deployed at Ongiva.
Our unit was now either at the call of Sector 10 northwards or southwards to Sector At thy calls 61 Mech shall not falter. These were all well known haunts of 61 Mech from the hey-days of Operation Protea. Our combat unit had deployed externally from 1 March until 7 March at the request of Sector The operation was intended as a show of force.
It aimed at physically dominating the Cunene Province by means of military power. Once again this swift intervention had served as a fair warning for the conventional enemy army to remain at bay: Cahama to the west of the Cunene River and Techamutete and Cassinga to the north — stay there enemy or else. On own initiative 61 Mech had changed this to 3-hours stand-by. This accounted for rapid deployment from the field as well.
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For that matter, the sub-units or our unit as a whole trained and did its military exercises anywhere. This was life with 61 Mech at its best, exciting times, living on the edge.
Where did the operational priorities of 61 Mech lay, to the north with Sector 10, or the south with Sector 30? The rainy season in the operational area normally lasted from April to December.
This provided the insurgents with sufficient drinking water to undertake deep infiltrations to the south. This observable fact furthermore brought flash rains to wash away their tracks; denser foliage to move under cover; inundations to impede the vehicular movement of security forces for cross-tracking and follow-ups and; showers to obscure the view of scouting aircraft.
In the meantime April was crawling closer. The terrorist threat towards the south was building up fatefully towards 14 April Who was responsible for this insurgent threat from the north? Sector 10 covered the western part and encapsulated Ovamboland. Sector 20 to the east was responsible for the Okavango Province. As it were, Sector 10 was already operating inside southern Angola across Ovamboland, within the Area-in-Dispute. As mentioned before, the man accountable and responsible to hold the enemies from entering the portals of Tsumeb, Otavi and Grootfontein was Colonel J.
Louw, the commander of Sector 30 situated at Otjiwarongo. At the beg and call that is and not to falter when crises reared its ugly head to the north, south, east or west of us. What loomed was ominous. The unfolding situation bode evil to the innocent community residing unawares to the south of Omuthiya and the Red Line. Was anyone responsible out there noticing the war clouds rising higher than ever before?
Or seeing the impending fire storm approaching more severe than ever? Apparently not, as nothing wise came forth that 61 Mech or the community could discern from the more informed to the north and south of us.
In the meantime seven large insurgent groups were already moving stealthily southwards on their voyage of death from SWAPO lairs deep inside southern Angola. The signs were there for all too see, ironically so. Operation Super which had been successfully completed by 32 Battalion a month ago, was a crystal clear indicator.
This should have been a clear indication that the intensity and scope of deep infiltrations to the south were about to change face from the past. This was their jump-off point for a well planned infiltration southwards through Kaokoland. The planned attack was aborted due to adverse weather conditions and was only carried through the next day. Thirty soldiers were deployed as stopper groups, while the main force of 45 launched the attack on the enemy base.
Although the terrorists greatly outnumbered the soldiers, they were surprised and overwhelmed — altogether two hundred and twenty one SWAPO insurgents were killed with only one managing to escape. Three members of 32 Battalion were killed in action and two sustained slight wounds. A large number of prisoners were captured and significant quantities of food, weapons and logistical equipment taken.
The mission was crowned with exceptional success. Forewarned is forearmed, the prompt for pre-emption and pro-active measures. Did this happen, yes or no? We were more or less minding our own business. Oh yes, we were planning, preparing, training and exercising fervently as usual.
This was operation normal for 61 Mech. Our current predicament was that the particulars of the impending enemy April-May invasion threat remained alluding. We could literally do nothing about the situation, apart from guessing, assessing, planning, preparing and waiting at the ready.
At 61 Mech we instinctively knew that the insurgents of Volcano were coming south — call it logic, gut feeling, womanly intuition, whatever. When, where, how, how many? Where they were now…?
Time and locale by map grid reference please…! Hey, is anybody interested in telling 61 Mech what the hell is happening out there? In our beloved corrugated iron operations centre at Omuthiya the maps were up — the enemy picture neatly marked and kept up to date hour-by-hour.
The radios were humming as our intelligence and operations personnel monitored the radio nets of Sectors 10 at Oshakati, 20 at Rundu and 30 at Otjiwarongo. The members of the HQ staff of 61 Mech were equally interested in the weather forecasts and similarly watched out for rain clouds. They knew the game: Their supporting staffs as well. They were old hand at infiltrations. We knew our enemy. We had made a list of battle indications we could use as yardsticks to monitor any omen coming from the vast bush lands to north of Omuthiya.
There were, however, four teeny-weenie issues which influenced the way 61 Mech went about its progressive day-to-day operational work. This especially concerned the impending enemy threat to innocent souls to the south of us, those innocents who lived at nearby farms and towns.
Those were the people who were depending on the might of the military machine in the region to safeguard them against stark terrorism. This responsibility 61 Mech had relinquished after Operation Carrot had been successfully completed by 18 April The mandate for this then reverted to Sector 30 whose responsibility it actually was. The package-deal included handing over the former role 61 Mech had to command the joint task force in times of crises. The reason for this was simply that 61 Mech was being committed more and more for fleeting operations into southern Angola.
This had become the nature of the beast. In fairness, this was the true role of 61 Mech. Such operations would in future obviously unfold under command of Sector The real worry was that we were hearing nothing from Sector Yes, there was a general emergency plan in place, which I would explain in more detail below.
The problem was that no particular contingency planning or pro-active measures were being undertaken for the brooding enmity on hand. This really had me worried as the bewitched month of April was creeping closer. To 61 Mech who knew and understood high readiness, this was not the way, if I may say so myself.
As it were, we were already on three hours stand-by for any possible threat, which could explode in our faces at any moment. Would we be there to support them if the time came? The perception of the community was that 61 Mech was theirs. Fortunately for them, we had always been available in the past for emergencies, more or less at beg and call. They had come to rely, respect and trust 61 Mech. What would their perceptions be, if trouble came and 61 Mech was not there to come to the rescue?
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Our sub-units still required extensive mission training and were in the process of acclimatizing and getting used to the operational ways of 61 Mech. They were however well trained, make no mistake about that.
The other plus point was that 61 Mech had outstanding soldiers, both permanent force and national servicemen. It was commanded and managed by a core of permanent force members and national service junior leaders. Those leaders were men of calibre. The previous year, prior to Operation Carrot, 61 Mech had done a comprehensive threat assessment and had compiled a contingency plan for such crises. The said plan was then war-gamed with all possible combat participants for such operations.
This occurred early in March For the season this plan was reassessed and now served as a base-line for our new sub-unit intake. Our HQ and other supporting capabilities were on stand-by and high-readiness as well. This was done in accordance with the aforementioned contingency plan: The two mechanised infantry companies for follow-ups, rapid response, ambushing, cross-tracking, etcetera; the armour squadron for mobile patrols, convoy duties, road-blocks, cross-tracking, cordoning, show of force and so forth; the artillery battery to deploy for farm protection operations, as the tradition was.
My battery commander, Major Chris Roux was a conscientious officer. Roux would be in overall control of all farm protection operations, if this should be required. Cool thinking and the ability to deploy and re-deploy rapidly was the name of the game.
Major Giel Reinecke would sort out the logistics, no question about that. One major concern remained. We dearly needed timeous early warning from Sector The whole stance of 61 Mech was to pre-empt and be pro-active. Our unit, as such, was extremely uncomfortable when we had no choice, but to wait for something to happen. Our dictum had always been to search for forward ground and to be ready at all times. Frustration was not the word to explain our current situation. So be it 61 Mech, be ready in any case, notwithstanding… After all, this was not our responsibility anymore.
It was the responsibility of Sector 30 and their Northern Border Company now deployed at Tsintsabis, was it not? In April-May they came. To achieve, the foe needed to assail simultaneously from Lubango via Cahama and Techamutete-Cassinga. The main goal was to terrorise the White farming community and to bring about propaganda gains through devious deeds in the Death Triangle. The enemy needed to cross vast expanses of ground to reach their targets and exfiltrate again.
It took planning, craft utilisation, time and effort. Own forces needed to track down and destroy the enemy across the same ground which took better planning, craftier utilisation, optimal utilisation of time and effort. Naturally all enemy infiltrating routes led south and exfiltrating routes led north. There were basically two aiming points for the enemy when attacking towards the killing area south of the Red Line: Firstly by pouncing on Kamanjab and Outjo from the western side of the Etosha and secondly, to take on Tsumeb-Grootfontein-Otavi- Otjiwarongo through the bush veldt, to the east of the Etosha.
To come through the stark Etosha Pan would be shear madness if without a respirator and sixteen jerry cans of water per combatant. It was difficult to survive and to hide in the harshness of this unforgiving terrain.
It was relatively easy to hunt the enemy down in the infertility of this killing field. From there by road to Cahama. From Cahama on foot, passing Ruacana to its east, southwards to the north-western fringes of the Etosha Game Reserve, km and counting.
Then, action stations, onto Kamanjab and Outjo, another gruelling km, for the dying to begin. To the east there were the abundance of cover, food and water of Ovamboland and Okavango — everything the insurgent required to sustain deep infiltrations to the far south. The one problem was the sandy soil conditions to the north of the Bravo cutline.
The sand stretched deep into southern Angola. This terrain was ideal for the tracking of the insurgents by the security forces. From their base our wily foe travelled in luxury by Russian Ural past Matala to Techamutete-Cassinga. Then it was a la foot all the way south, until the lights of Tsumeb winked, km to go and counting.
To the south of the Red Line it was another winter ballgame all together. There were plentiful hiding place in the dense thorny bush and the ground was extremely firm and rocky, which made tracking difficult for own forces. There were, however, a few advantages for the hunters. The first was the mere fact that they knew the terrain better than the enemy did.
The next was the excellent infrastructure, which allowed the rapid deployments of forces by ground and air means. Especially those committed, tenacious local trackers, the mainstay against terrorism.
They were out there, taking point, searching for and destroying the enemy at high tempo, notwithstanding the thorns. The hard rocky earth, nor the Russian Pom-Z personnel mines, could put off the undaunted trackers and their persistent follow-up groups.
The highly committed teams were spreading out on the ground — relentlessly searching and destroying until the job was done. The local fighters were supreme, they knew the ground man, and they knew the ground.
The foxes left countless Russian Pom-Z mines and other booby-traps in their wakes to deter the hounds. During Operation Yahoo many a follow-up force became victim of those explosive devices left behind by the receding enemy.
To enemy mines alone our force sustained two killed and twenty six wounded. The answers to these threats of the undaunted were sixth sense, superb field craft, eyes to the ground, eyes to the front, fire, take cover, win the fire fight, fire and manoeuvre from the ground and the air, and fight through the enemy to the other side.
To carry on and repeat the performance until the job was done. Alpha and Bravo were well maintained. The Bravo cut-line was patrolled on a daily basis throughout the year. Every day the km was traversed by soldier, Buffel mine protected troop carrier and broom. The broom was usually a small tree pulled behind the vehicle, which left clean drag marks for the next patrol to follow, so as to find enemy tracks more easily. The Bravo was based on the Red Line; the Alpha was located parallel to the Bravo, 10km further to the north.
Cut-line Charlie lay approximately 30km further north inside Ovamboland and was also parallel to the Alpha and Bravo. On completion of Operation Carrot in April it was decided to develop an additional cut-line further to the south of Bravo inside the farming area. The aforementioned cut-line was still being constructed when Operation Yahoo commenced on 14 April The new cut-line was known as Delta and lay approximately 30 km to the north of Tsumeb — it cut across farms and fences from east to west.
A yellow grader was still standing on the Delta, left abandoned by its crew. It would later on in Yahoo entice a group of insurgents stupidly so to fire a RPG rocket at in the darkness.